Secure and Scalable Communications Protocol for Data Collection with Time Minimization in the Smart Grid by Suleyman Uludag et al.
Secure and Scalable Communications Protocol for
Data Collection with Time Minimization in the
Smart Grid
Suleyman Uludag1, King-Shan Lui2, Wenyu Ren3, and Klara Nahrstedt3
1Department of Computer Science, University of Michigan - Flint, MI, USA
2Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
3Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
Abstract—Deployment of data generation devices, such as
sensors and smart meters, has been accelerating towards the
vision of Smart Grid. With insufficiencies of the legacy power
grid communications protocols, increased data generation and
communications bring about new challenges in collecting the data
securely, efficiently and in a scalable fashion. Power operators are
increasingly concerned about the data collection and processing
to ensure smooth and effective operations. In this paper, we
present a secure, and scalable data communications protocol for
Smart Grid data collection. Under a hierarchical architecture,
relay nodes (aka data collectors) collect and convey the data
securely from measurement devices to the power operator. While
the data collectors can verify the integrity, they are not given
access to the content, which may pave the way for third
party providers to deliver value-added services or even the
data collection itself. We further present optimization solutions
for minimizing the total data collection time. An optimal, but
intractable solution is complemented with two fast heuristics.
Extensive simulations show that heuristics provide a good ap-
proximation to the optimal formulation with fast running times.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Smart Grid, massive number of sensors or measure-
ment devices will be installed to collect real-time information
for monitoring. The generated data should be collected in
a secure and scalable manner. A hierarchical data collection
framework is usually adopted to make data collection scalable.
For example, in Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI), smart
meters first report data to data concentrators [1]–[3]. Data
concentrators can then pre-process the data, if necessary,
before reporting to the power operator. In this way, the power
operator does not have to maintain a separate connection with
each smart meter, which is extremely expensive. Besides, data
concentrators can aggregate the data, reported by the smart
meters, to further reduce the message size. Apart from data
collection, this hierarchical communication structure should
also allow a delivery of a command or an instruction, issued by
the power operator to be delivered to a meter or measurement
device in an efficient and secure manner. In this paper, we
develop a comprehensive protocol that allows a power operator
to collect data, as well as send commands to measurement
devices in a secure, scalable, and efficient manner under a
hierarchical data collection model.
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Fig. 1. Hierarchical Data Collection Structure.
Fig. 1 presents the data collection architecture considered
in this paper. The Measurement Devices (MDs) are sensors
or smart meters that generate power-grid specific data. They
are small telemetric devices and computationally constrained.
Each MD is connected to at least one Data Collector (DC),
and each DC may connect to multiple MDs. The Power
Operator (PO) has a direct connection with each DC. PO and
DCs are relatively more powerful than MDs. The data are
reported to Power Operator (PO) via a set of Data Collectors
(DCs). PO may also issue commands to the MDs via the DCs.
Theoretically, a DC is trustworthy if it is within the security
domain of the PO.
However, due to the massive number of MDs and their
dispersion over a large area, it may not be appropriate to
assume DCs can be completely trusted. In addition, one of the
seven actors identified by the NIST in the SG Framework [4]
is third party service providers which are to furnish third party
value-added services. We assume honest-but-curious model for
DCs. Thus, the data collection tasks may be outsourced to
third party service providers [5]. Besides, the benefits of cloud
computing [6] may be accrued for storage and processing of
the data collected. Data sharing to others to provide services
like energy management services can be facilitated as well.
In some other applications [7], DCs are mobile and the
connections between DCs and MDs are dynamic. Therefore,
it would be desirable for MDs to encrypt their data in a way
that DCs do not have access to them. In other words, each
MD should encrypt its data using an appropriate key to keep
its data private to DCs and other possible adversaries. On the
other hand, due to limitation in memory and computational
capability, the encryption algorithm used should be efficient.
PO should also protect its commands appropriately. Apart from
ensuring the security of these commands, it is also crucial
to deliver these commands promptly because fast actions of
MDs are necessary to maintain the stability and health of
the smart grid. In this work, we develop a customized key
establishment scheme and data collection protocol to protect
the data and commands sent between PO and MDs via DCs
in a scalable and efficient manner. In particular, our protocol
has the following features:
1) Data reported by a certain MD can be accessed by the
PO only, even the message is transported by a DC.
2) The protocol is light-weight in the sense that MDs do
not have to perform expensive operations to report data
and it does not take a lot of memory to remember key
information.
3) The protocol allows commands and urgent data to be
delivered promptly and securely.
One or more DCs can be designated to collect data from
a certain MD. However, the cost, the delay, and the security
of data collection may differ among different DCs. The PO
should select DCs according to the performance requirements.
Different optimization objectives can be developed. In this
paper, we study the time needed for the PO to collect all data
from the MDs via the DCs. We study how to assign MDs to
DCs such that the time of data collection can be minimized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes existing efforts on data collection in smart grids.
We provide the system and protocol overview in Section III.
The details of the protocol are described in Sections IV and
V. In Section VI, we analyze the time performance of our
mechanism and present the DC-MD assignment problem as an
optimization problem. We also propose two heuristic methods
to solve the NP-hard assignment problem. We then evaluate
the performance of the heuristic solutions in Section VII. We
conclude our paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Security and privacy issues in the Smart Grid are pre-
sented in [8]. Data integrity and confidentiality are the ma-
jor security concerns. End-to-end data protection has been
studied extensively in the Internet. However, most schemes,
such as TLS [9], assume the devices have abundant memory
and computational power to perform expensive cryptographic
operations. In smart grids, on the other hand, reporting devices
have limited memory with a slow CPU. Traditional Internet
security protocols are thus not suitable for data collection in
smart grids. DNP3 [10] is a standard communication protocol
used in SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition).
It assumes all components are within the security perimeter
of the operator and is not designed to protect data forwarded
by the DC as in our situation. A more recent standard
for substation automation is the IP-based IEC 61850 [11].
Yet, IEC 61850 was also initially designed without security
mechanisms [12]. It is thus generally agreed by the experts
that new security protocols for data collection and command
delivery need to be developed.
Some efforts have been put on key management of smart
meters and sensors in smart grid. [13] describes a key man-
agement scheme for secure communication in smart grid. The
scheme develops keys for unicast, multicast, and broadcast.
Nodes are arranged as binary trees and the secret key of parent
is the hash of the children keys. How different parties process
or encrypt the data is not discussed. It is not clear whether the
data reported by a certain meter can be hidden from the data
collector. [14] also considers the key management problem for
a massive number of smart meters. Key graph is used to man-
age unicast, multicast, and broadcast keys. Nevertheless, as
DC is not considered in the architecture, the key management
scheme cannot be applied in our scenario. The SAKE protocol
[15] allows two neighboring sensor nodes to establish keys
using hash chains. However, the authors assume the attackers
are of limited computational capability as another sensor. The
authors in [16] apply the elliptic curve public key technique
to perform key management. Mutual authentication between
different entities is studied. Nevertheless, there is no discussion
on how to protect the data reported by a sensor.
Some protocols have been developed to establish shared
keys when the two parties can establish direct communication.
[17] describes how to establish keys and secure unicast and
multicast communications. The authors suggest keys to be
established by direct connection between the two entities that
need shared keys. [18] describes how to apply the Diffie-
Hellman mechanism to establish a shared key for data authen-
tication between two parties. [19], on the other hand, relies
on identity-based cryptography. All these mechanisms cannot
be applied in the hierarchical data collection model because
the PO and the MDs cannot establish a direct connection.
The authors in [20] describe how a device establishes shared
keys with different controllers at different hierarchical levels.
However, it is assumed that a shared key exists between two
adjacent controllers.
Some efforts have been put in studying the transport proto-
col for data collection among a massive number of MDs. [21]
studies how to reduce the storage needed when the control
center needs to establish multiple sessions with the MDs.
MDs are configured with a long-term shared key with the
control center upon manufacturing. A function is used to
generate this key. Thus, the control center does not have to
remember a lot of keys but can derive the key when needed.
Nevertheless, the key developed this way is not very secure.
Besides, the protocol is not suitable for the hierarchical data
collection architecture. Data collection through a data collector
is considered in [22]. The authors propose to maintain two
separate TCP connections: one between the control center and
the data collector, and another between the MD and the data
collector. The two connections can be protected using different
mechanisms independently. Nevertheless, the data collector is
assumed to be trustworthy that it can read the data sent by the
MD.
[23] studies how data generators report data to a honest-but-
curious storage center for a user to retrieve later. To the best of
our knowledge, the data collection trust model assumed in this
paper is the most related to our scenario. The storage center
is similar to the DC in our model that it is semi-trusted, and
data should be hidden from it. MDs in our model are the data
generators, while PO is a user in their model. However, the
paper suggests to use expensive identity-based and public key
encryption to protect data to incorporate policy consideration.
The experimental computational time for a decryption on
a message of size less than 1000 bits in a low-end smart
meter (TinyPBC library on a 32-bit ARM XScale PXA271
processor) is around 140ms, while the encryption is supposed
to be a few times more expensive. Our protocol, on the
other hand, encrypts data using the much more light-weighted
symmetric key cryptography. We also perform experiments to
study the time performance of our mechanism.
As for the security of the data collection task, there are
two major approaches: One is to ensure the protection of
the data content directly without regard to the data seman-
tics. An approach presented in [24] is based on symmetric
cryptography to provide data confidentiality and authentication
between sensors and the base station. [25] describes a protocol
for DC to collect data from an MD, but direct communi-
cation between DC and MD is assumed. Another category
for providing security exploits the aggregate statistics of the
sensed data, such as summation, average, minimum, maxi-
mum, etc. These approaches take advantage of in-network data
processing (also referred to as aggregation) to induce some
obfuscating operations on the transmitted data [3], [26]–[33].
Examples of this category include cluster-based private data
aggregation [26] and its integrity enhanced version [27], secret
perturbation [28], k-indistinguishable privacy-preserving data
aggregation [29], a centralized authentication server based
in-network aggregation for AMI [30], [31], homomorphic
encryption-based aggregation [32], a secure architecture for
distributed aggregation of additive data [3], and a network
coding-based encryption between smart meters and aggre-
gators [33]. Our problem formulation does not assume any
statistical property for in-network processing.
None of the papers mentioned above studies how to assign
MDs to DCs. We formulate this assignment problem, provide
an optimal ILP formulation, show its complexity as NP-Hard,
and then develop two fast heuristic algorithms.
III. SYSTEM AND PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
A. Operations and their requirements
As mentioned in Section I, our communication architecture
supports MDs to report data and PO to deliver commands in
a timely and secure manner. Table I describes each operation.
Op 1 is a regular call-for-data from the PO which is performed
periodically. Op 2 is performed when PO detects something
abnormal and would like a data report from a particular MD.
Time is more critical than a regular data reporting. Op 3 is
done when MD detects something abnormal and would like
to report to the PO. OP 4 is issued when PO needs a group
of MDs to perform a certain action as soon as possible.
We develop our protocol to be secure from outsider attacks
such as eavesdropping, impersonation, and message tamper-
ing, etc. There are three types of insiders in the protocol:
PO, DCs, and MDs. We assume the PO is always trustworthy
because it is the control of the whole system. The DCs, on
the other hand, are honest-but-curious that they would follow
the protocol as specified but would like to read the data
and share with others if they could. That is, they would not
impersonate another entity in the system, nor actively tamper
the data, but would like to learn as much as possible based
on the information they can access according to the normal
operation of the protocol. As the MDs are devices located
in the field (for example, on power grid poles), they are not
likely to be in a very secure physical environment. We thus
assume the MDs may be compromised after installation. In
other words, an attacker takes over the MD and is able to
read the key information kept in the device. In this situation,
the attacker can report fake data to the PO on behalf of the
MD. Our protocol cannot identify whether the data reported
using a legitimate key is generated by an attacker, but our
protocol ensures this compromised MD cannot impersonate
others based on the key information it has. To detect whether
a certain MD is compromized, intrusion detection techniques
can be used, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. System Parameters
Before any communication, PO, DCs, and MDs are
equipped with a set of system parameters. We assume nec-
essary parameters are configured in a DC or MD before they
are installed in the field.
1) Long-term keys: We assume there is a key server that can
generate a set of public and private keys for each entity in
the system. The public/private key pair is configured into
a DC or MD before it is installed in the field. PO, on the
other hand, apart from keeping its own key pair, it also
remembers the public keys of all MDs and DCs in the
system. We denote the public key and private key of A
as A+ and A−, respectively. Under normal circumstances,
PO would not publish the public keys of DCs and MDs to
the general public. However, our protocol is secure even
if the attackers know the public key information of any
DC or MD they want to attack.
2) Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters: We adopt the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange mechanism to develop shared
keys. The DH key exchange works as follows: When
Alice and Bob want to generate a shared key using DH,
they first each generate a random number and keep it as
a secret. Let a and b be the secret, also called the secret
DH half key, of Alice and Bob, respectively. They then
exchange gamod p and gbmod p, where p is prime and g
is a primitive root mod p. gamod p (gbmod p) is called
the public half key or public DH key of Alice (Bob).
When Alice receives the public half key gbmod p sent
by Bob, she can compute the shared key gabmod p by
(gbmod p)amod p. Similarly, Bob can compute the shared
key by (gamod p)bmod p. Although eavesdroppers can
Operation Security Requirement Time Requirement
Op 1 PO initiates data collection of all MDsor a group of MDs
Data reported should be authenticated and
should be read only by the PO, not by other
MDs or any DC
The total time to collect all data should be
minimized
Op 2 PO requests data from a certain MD Same as Op 1 The time needed should be kept minimal
Op 3 MD initiates an urgent data report Same as Op 1 The data should be delivered to the PO assoon as possible
Op 4 PO issues an urgent command to agroup of MDs
The command should be authenticated ap-
propriately
Time for each MD to receive and read the
command should be minimized
TABLE I
SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND THEIR REQUIREMENTS
overhear gamod p and gbmod p, they cannot compute
gabmod p. Therefore, the shared key is secure. Through
forgetting half keys and shared keys appropriately, DH
keys also support perfect forward secrecy.
Before using the DH mechanism, the PO, DCs, and MDs
have to agree on the g and p to be used. We assume PO
picks g and p and configures them into DCs and MDs
before installation. To make the discussion concise, we
drop mod p when the context is clear in the rest of the
paper.
C. Cryptographic functions
To provide authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and
other security protections, messages have to be encrypted,
hashed, or signed. We assume the PO selects appropriate
cryptographic algorithms for the purposes, and these functions
are installed in the DCs and MDs. For example, PO may use
AES for symmetric key encryption and SHA-256 for hash
computation. Table II summarizes the functions used in the
protocol. Function GENKEY (X ,Y ) is used when we need
a key generated from two numbers X and Y . This function
is very computationally inexpensive and the time needed is
negligible when compared with any cryptographic function.
Name Description
PKE(K,M) apply public key encryption on M using K
PKD(K,C) apply public key decryption on C using K
SKE(K,M) apply symmetric key encryption on M using K
SKD(K,C) apply symmetric key decryption on C using K
SIGN(A,M) signature of M by A (created using A−)
SIGV (A,M) verify signature of M signed by A using A+
HASH(K,M) compute keyed-hash of M using key K
GENKEY (X ,Y ) generate a key based on X and Y
TABLE II
SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
Some cryptographic functions run much slower than others.
As some smart grid operations are time sensitive, it is very
crucial to identify efficient cryptographic functions appropri-
ately to protect the communication. To further understand
the computational time of the cryptographic functions on
computationally constrained devices, we measure the time
needed to execute some representative cryptographic functions
on Raspberry Pi. Raspberry Pi is a tiny computer with a size
similar to a credit card. The CPU is 700MHz and the memory
available is 512MB.
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Fig. 2. Computational Time of Symmetric Key Functions and Hashes.
Fig. 2 shows the computational times of AES with a 256-
bit key and SHA-256 of messages of different sizes. We
have measured the times needed using other key sizes and
the results are similar. Generally speaking, the amounts of
time needed for symmetric key operations and hashes grow
linearly with the size of the messages, while the growth
rate of encryption/decryption is higher. The times for AES
encryption and decryption on a message of 128 bytes (1024
bits) are less than 130 µs. The measured encryption and
decryption times of 2048-bit RSA on a 1024-bit message on
Raspberry Pi are around 7000 µs and 306 ms, respectively. We
thus can conclude that data protection through symmetric key
cryptographic functions allows a much faster data collection
process.
RSA 1024 bits 3072 bits
Message
Size (bits)
Sign.
(ms)
Ver.
(ms)
sign/ver
ratio
Sign.
(ms)
Ver.
(ms)
sign/ver
ratio
128 64.01 3.91 15.12 1048.37 11.49 91.23
256 64.97 4.01 16.19 1033.46 11.65 88.68
512 64.27 4.00 16.08 1047.96 11.69 89.67
TABLE III
RSA COMPUTATIONAL TIME
Table III presents the time needed to create an RSA sig-
nature and verify an RSA signature using different key sizes.
The time spent on encrypting a message using public key is
similar to the time needed in verifying a signature. The time
needed on decrypting a message using private key is similar
to the time needed on signature creation. It can be observed
that the time needed does not grow with message size but
with key size. Column ratio in the table gives the time ratio
of signature computationsignature verification . In an RSA key pair, the public key
is usually much smaller than the private key [34]. Therefore,
the time spent on a private key operation (signing a message)
is much longer than that on a public key operation (verifying
a signature). The difference becomes more prominent when a
longer RSA key is used. For example, when the 1024-bit key
is used, the time ratio signature computationsignature verification is about 16, but
the ratio rises to 90 when the key size is 3072. Because of the
high complexity of RSA private key operations, an efficient
protocol should not require MDs to sign a lot of messages.
Time in microseconds 1024 bits 2048 bits 3072 bits
Private Key Generation 347 408 468
Public Key Generation 23884 76996 235600
Shared Key Generation 30583 92115 261791
TABLE IV
DIFFIE-HELLMAN COMPUTATIONAL TIME
We also measured the time needed to generate different
Diffie-Hellman keys with different key sizes (Table IV). It
is worth noting that a DH shared key generation is more
expensive than an RSA signature verification. It implies that it
may not be appropriate to re-generate DH shared key for each
data collection instance. By adopting different cryptographic
functions and techniques carefully based on their security fea-
tures and computational complexities, our protocol facilitates
efficient and secure data collection.
D. Protocol Overview
Because encrypting data using public key cryptography is
very expensive, before any data collection, we should first
develop shared keys among PO, DCs, and MDs for data
protection. To ensure data reported by a certain MD can be
decrypted by the PO only, we need to establish a key that
is known by PO and that MD. We call a key that is known
by exactly two parties a pairwise shared key. PO and each
DC should also develop a pairwise shared key to protect
their conversations. The same applies to DC with each MD
it will talk to. Apart from pairwise keys, to facilitate a certain
command or instruction to be delivered to a group of MDs in
a secure and efficient manner, we also develop a set of group
keys that each group key is shared between the PO, a DC, and
the MDs that connect to that DC. The group keys will also be
used to update the pairwise shared keys efficiently. We will
describe the details in Section IV-B.
The PO initiates the Shared Key Generation Process to
establish the necessary pairwise shared keys and group keys.
We adopt the Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism to
develop all pairwise shared keys. We authenticate the DH half
keys using the long-term public keys to avoid the man-in-
the-middle attack. Once the pairwise shared keys and group
keys are established, they will be used for data collection and
command delivery.
As shown in Table IV, DH operations are expensive. We
should not re-generate the DH shared keys for every data
collection. However, it may not be very secure if we use the
same shared keys to encrypt data collected at different times.
To strike a balance of computational complexity and security,
the data encryption key for each data collection instance
depends on both the DH shared key and the timestamp. As
the timestamp changes for every data collection instance, the
data encryption key will be changed even though we do not
re-generate the DH shared key. In the following, we will first
describe the Shared Key Generation process in Section IV. The
detailed message exchanges of the four operations mentioned
in Section III-A will be provided in Section V.
IV. SHARED KEY GENERATION
Let the set of MDs be MD and the set of DCs be DC. Before
the PO initiates the process, PO has to assign a set of MDs
for DC to connect to. We let MDLISTi ⊆MD be the set of
MDs that are assigned to DCi. Definitely, ∪DCi∈DCMDLISTi =
MD. However, MDLISTi ∩MDLISTj, where i 6= j, may not
necessarily be /0. It is possible that PO would like multiple
DCs to collect data from the same MD to enhance reliability.
In fact, different assignments between MDs and DCs would
differ in data security, cost, and data collection time. In Section
VI, we will formulate the assignment problem to minimize the
data collection time.
In the rest of this paper, for the ease of discussion, we use
shared key to refer to pairwise shared key. We further denote
KAB as the shared key between A and B. We refer to the set
{PO,DCi}∪MDLISTi as group Gi, and the group key of Gi is
GKi. We use M1||M2 to represent concatenating messages M1
and M2. The definitions of the functions used can be found
in Table II.
A. Initial Shared Key Generation
Figure 3 presents a summary of the initial shared key
generation process. When the procedure starts, the only keys
an MD or a DC knows are its own public/private keys and
the public key of the PO. After the procedure, MD j should
have established KPOMD j , D
DCi
MD j , and GKi if MD j ∈ MDLISTi.
Through the procedure, DCi knows GKi, KPODCi and K
DCi
MD j for
all MD j ∈MDLISTi. The detailed procedure is as follows:
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  ||	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PO	   DC	   MD	  
PKE(DC+,	  ga	  ||	  T1)	  SIGN(PO,	  ga	  ||	  T1)	  
PKE(PO+,	  gb	  ||	  T1)	  SKE(K,	  T1)	  
K	  =	  gab	  mod	  p	  
C	  =	  gc	  ||	  GK	   DC
+,	  PKE(MD+,	  C	  ||	  ge	  ||T2),	  	  
SIGN(PO,	  C	  ||	  DC+)	  SIGN(DC,	  ge||T2)	  
PKE(DC+,	  gd)	  SIGN(MD,	  gd	  ||	  T2)	  
SKE(K,	  gd||	  T2)	  SIGN(MD,	  gd	  ||	  T2)	   gcd	  –	  shared	  key	  between	  PO	  and	  MD	  
ged	  –	  shared	  key	  between	  DC	  and	  MD	  
GK	  –	  group	  key	  
Fig. 3. Initial Shared Key Generation.
1) PO starts the key generation process. It first generates a
DH secret a to talk to the DCs. It is possible for PO
to use different a’s for different DCs. If so, PO has to
remember the a used for each DC. Apart from a, PO
also captures the current timestamp T 1 and sends the
following message to DCi.
PO→ DCi: PKE(DC+i ,ga||T 1),SIGN(PO,ga||T 1)
This message is secure from message tampering and
impersonating because an attacker cannot sign ga||T 1
correctly.
2) When DCi receives the message, it retrieves ga and T 1
using DC−i and PO
+. It verifies whether T 1 is reasonable.
If so, it generates its DH secret b and computes K as
gabmod p. K is then the shared key between PO and DCi
(KPODCi ). It also replies PO its public DH key.
DCi→ PO: PKE(PO+,gb||T 1),SKE(K,T 1)
An attacker, who does not know DC−i , cannot develop K
and produce a correct message.
3) When PO receives the message, it can retrieve gb using
PO− to compute K. It also verifies SKE(K,T 1) to ensure
it was DCi who sent the message. It then sends DCi the
list of MDs, together with the MDs’ public keys, that it
assigns DCi to talk to. It also creates C for DCi to talk
to the MDs in the list. C contains gc, which is used for
establishing shared keys between PO and MDs, and GKi,
which is the group key of Gi. The public keys of the
MDs should also be sent (We assume they are included
in MDLISTi in Figure 3). It is worth noting that PO also
sends SIGN(PO,C||DC+i ) to DCi. This signature is to
avoid messages from being tampered.
PO→ DCi: SKE(K,MDLISTi||C||SIGN(PO,C||DC+i ))
where C = gc||GKi
4) After verifying SIGN(PO,C||DC+i ) to ensure the message
has not been tampered, DCi can then generate its DH
half key, gei for establishing shared keys with the MDs.
DCi also captures the current timestamp T 2 and sends
the information to MD j in MDLISTi using the public
keys provided. DCi also needs to send its public key.
To protect DC+i and C||gei ||T 2 from being tampered,
SIGN(PO,C||DC+) and SIGN(DCi,gei ||T 2) are sent as
well.
DCi→MD j: DC+i , PKE(MD+j ,C||gei ||T 2),
SIGN(PO,C||DC+), SIGN(DCi,gei ||T 2)
5) Upon receiving the message, MD j retrieves C||gei ||T 2
and verifies the signatures. It then generates a DH secret
key d to establish the shared key between itself and PO
(KPOMD j ), which is g
cd , and the shared key with DCi(K
DCi
MD j ),
which is geid . It sends the information of gd to DCi.
As DCi sends the same gei and T 2 to all other MDs in
MDLISTi, MD j has to sign gd to authenticate the reply.
MD j→ DCi: PKE(DC+i ,gd), SIGN(MD j,gd ||T 2)
6) When DCi receives the message, it retrieves gd and veri-
fies the signature. If so, it sends PO the key information.
DCi→ PO: SKE(K,gd ||T 2), SIGN(MD j,gd ||T 2)
7) If gd ||T 2 encrypted using K and signed by MD j are the
same, the message has not been tampered. PO can then
compute the KPOMD j to be g
cd . Note that as DCi can only
read gc and gd but neither c nor d, it cannot compute gcd .
gcd is thus a key shared by PO and MD j only.
We now analyze the memory needed for each entity to keep
the shared keys. The PO needs to keep a shared key for each
DC, a shared key for each MD, and a group key for each
group. The total number of keys is 2x|DC| + |MD|. DCi has
to keep KPODCi , a shared key with each MD belongs to its group,
and a group key. The total is 2 + |MDLISTi|. For MD j, for
each group Gi it belongs to, it has to keep a shared key with
DCi and the group key GKi. It is worth noting that MD j can
establish different shared keys with PO through different DCs.
If PO provides different gc’s for different DCs, the shared keys
developed via different DCs must be different. Even when PO
provides the same gc through different DCs, MD j can also
establish different shared keys by replying different gd’s for
different DCs. Therefore, MD j has to keep at most 3 x number
of groups it belongs to keys in total. PO decides how many
groups an MD is associated with and can thus establish keys
according to the memory available in different MDs.
B. Shared Key Update
The shared keys generated are expected to be used in the
subsequent data collections and command deliveries. As this
shared key generation process would not be launched for every
single data collection, time and computational complexities are
thus not a very major concern, especially for the first time the
shared keys are generated. On the other hand, a secure system
should periodically change the shared keys used. If the keys
have to be frequently changed, the procedure in Fig. 3 might
be too expensive as an MD has to handle several expensive
public key and DH operations. To reduce the complexity, if
the shared keys being used currently are still secure (remain
secret to attackers), we can replace the public key encryptions
and signatures by symmetric key encryptions as shown in Fig.
4.
In the communication between PO and DCi, both PO and
DCi now encrypt their DH half keys using the current KPODCi
instead of the public keys. In Step 4, DCi uses the current
group key GKi to encrypt C||ge||T 2 so that it can be sent to all
MD j ∈MDLISTi. To avoid a malicious MD who knows GKi
from impersonating DCi, DCi sends also SKE(K
DCi
MD j ,T 2) to
authenticate the message to MD j. In Step 5, MD j only needs to
encrypt its new DH half key using symmetric key. Thus, MD j
does not need to perform any expensive public key operations
but only needs to perform the three necessary DH operations
to compute gd , gcd , and geid for changing keys. To understand
how much time we could save by using the simplified shared
key generation, we measure the times needed for an MD to
process the message from the DC and prepare the reply when
different RSA and DH key sizes are used. The results are
presented in Fig. 5. More time is saved when a longer RSA key
is used. It implies that the shared key update process allows
a longer RSA key to be used to enhance security.
PO	   DC	   MD	  
SKE(K1,	  ga	  ||	  T1)	  SIGN(PO,	  ga	  ||	  T1)	  
SKE(K1,	  gb	  ||	  T1)	  SKE(gab,	  T1)	  
SKE(gab,	  MDLIST	  ||	  C	  ||	  SKE(GK,	  C))	  
C	  =	  gc	  ||	  GKnew	   SKE(GK,	  C	  ||	  ge	  ||T2)	  SKE(K3,	  T2)	  
SKE(K2,	  gd)	  SKE(K3,	  gd	  ||T2)	  SKE(ged,	  T2)	  	  
SKE(gab,	  gd	  ||SKE(K2,	  gd))	  
K1	  –	  current	  key	  between	  PO	  and	  DC	  
K2	  –	  current	  key	  between	  PO	  and	  MD	  
K3	  –	  current	  key	  between	  DC	  and	  MD	  
GK	  –	  current	  group	  key	  
Fig. 4. Shared Key Update.
Fig. 5. Time Comparison of Initial Key Generation and Key Update.
It is worth noting that in the key update procedure, it is
possible for a malicious DC to trick an MD to accept a fake
C created by the DC. This should not happen if all DCs
are honest-but-curious. In case it is necessary to protect a
previously honest but now malicious DC to issue the attack,
the PO can sign C. That is, instead of sending SKE(GK,C),
PO should send SIGN(PO,C) to the MDs via the DC.
PO can start collect data after the shared keys are estab-
lished. We will describe the details of each operation in the
next section.
V. DATA COLLECTION AND COMMAND DELIVERY
A. PO initiates Data Collection of a Group of or All MDs
It is a regular data collection initiated by the PO. To ensure
the data reported can be read by the PO only, MD j should
encrypt the data using KPOMD j . The protocol should not request
MDs to perform a lot of expensive operations as well. To
reduce the total time needed, we should reduce the number of
messages PO or DC has to create. In the following, we first
present the data collection procedure in a step by step manner.
Fig. 6 shows the whole process. In the figure, K1, K2, and K3
are KPODCi , K
PO
MD j , and K
DCi
MD j , respectively.
1) PO first identifies all the DCs that it needs to talk to
according to a certain optimization criterion. It captures
the current timestamp T and sends a message to DCi.
Note that it is possible that PO does not want to collect
data from some MDs in MDLISTi. If so, PO should also
include the list of intended MDs. We omit that in our
protocol to simplify the discussion.
PO→ DCi: SKE(KPODCi ,T ||SIGN(PO,T ))
PO	   DC	   MD	  
M1	  =	  SKE(K1,	  T	  ||	  SIGN(PO,	  T))	  
M2	  =	  SKE(GK,	  T	  ||	  SIGN(PO,	  T))	  
M3	  =	  PRODATA,	  HASH(GENKEY(K3,	  T),	  PRODATA)	  
M4	  =	  SKE(GENKEY(K1,	  T),	  PRODATA)	  
K1	  –	  shared	  key	  between	  PO	  and	  DC	  
K2	  –	  shared	  key	  between	  PO	  and	  MD	  
K3	  –	  shared	  key	  between	  DC	  and	  MD	  
GK	  –	  group	  key	  
PRODATA	  is	  encrypted	  and	  
integrity-­‐protected	  using	  
GENKEY(K2,	  T)	  
Fig. 6. Data Collection.
2) DCi verifies the signature and checks whether T is
reasonable. It then sends T to MD j ∈MDLISTi (or only
the MDs PO wants to collect data from).
DCi→MD j: SKE(GKi,T ||SIGN(PO,T ))
By encrypting the message using the group key GKi, DCi
only needs to create a single message for all MDs in
its group. However, the group key cannot authenticate it
was PO who requested the data collection because it is a
key shared by many entities. We thus need to include a
signature of PO to facilitate authentication. This message
should work fine if DCi has to collect data from every MD
in MDLISTi. However, when some MDs are not supposed
to report data, those are not reporting can also read T
in the message. If this is a serious concern, DCi can
send SKE(KDCiMD j ,T ||SIGN(PO,T )) to the involved MDs
instead. The disadvantage of this approach is DCi needs to
create a different message for different MD and possibly
incurs more delay in the data collection process.
3) After verifying T , MD j generates a key MK =
GENKEY (KPOMD j ,T ). An encryption key and an integrity
key developed based on MK are used to protect the data.
The protected data is denoted as PRODATA. As MK
depends on T , different MK’s will be used for different
data collection instances even KPOMD j is not changed. MD j
also generates DK = GENKEY (KDCiMD j ,T ). The hash of
PRODATA using DK is computed and sent to DCi.
MD j→ DCi: PRODATA,HASH(DK,PRODATA)
4) DCi verifies the hash to ensure PRODATA was gener-
ated by MD j even it cannot decrypt PRODATA. It then
forwards PRODATA to PO.
DCi→ PO: SKE(GENKEY (KPODCi ,T ),PRODATA)
Alternatively, DCi can encrypt all the replies from MDs
in a single message. In this case, only a single symmetric
key encryption is needed, but PO may receive some data
later.
5) Finally, PO develops MK on its own to extract the data
from PRODATA.
Step PO DCi MD j
Step 1 1 SIGN + |DC|
SKE
- -
Step 2 - 1 SKD + 1 SIGV +
1 SKE
-
Step 3 - - 1 SKD + 1 SIGV +
1 SKE + 2 HASH
Step 4 - |MDLISTi| HASH
+ |MDLISTi| SKE
-
Step 5 2|MD| SKD +
|MD| HASH
- -
TABLE V
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF DATA COLLECTION
We now analyze the complexity of the whole process of
data collection from the perspective of each entity. We first
develop a summary of the cryptographic functions needed in
each step in Table V. In the table, we use the function names
in Table II to represent a function.
In Step 1, PO only needs to sign T once as the sig-
nature included in the messages to all DCs is the same.
After the signature is created, it uses the shared key with
different DCi to encrypt the message using symmetric key
cryptography. In Step 2, DC needs to decrypt the message
and verify the signature. It then encrypts the message to
the MDs in MDLISTi using the group key. In Step 3, 1
decryption and 1 signature verification are first needed. In
generating PRODATA, 1 hash and 1 symmetric key encryption
operations are applied. Another hash operation is used to
compute HASH(DK,PRODATA). In Step 4, for each message
received, DCi has to verify the hash and encrypt PRODATA
again. DCi receives |MDLISTi| messages in total. Finally in
Step 5, for each report from MD j, PO first decrypts using the
shared key with DCi. It then decrypts and verifies the hash
of PRODATA. Therefore, for each reply of MD, it takes 2
symmetric key encryption operations and 1 hash operations.
There are altogether |MD| replies.
It can be observed that each MD, each DC, and the PO need
to perform one public key operation only no matter how many
messages it has to handle. Besides, the signature verification
that MDs and DCs have to perform is not very expensive when
compared with signature creation. Our protocol is thus very
light-weight and scalable.
B. PO requests data from MD j
1) PO first identifies a certain DCi such that MD j ∈ Gi. T
is the timestamp. Apart from signing the timestamp, PO
also encrypts the timestamp using KPOMD j .
PO→ DCi: SKE(KPODCi ,T ||SIGN(PO,T )||SKE(KPOMD j ,T ))
2) DCi sends the information to MD j after verifying the
signature on T .
DCi→MD j: SKE(KDCiMD j ,T ||SKE(KPOMD j ,T ))
Steps 3 - 5 are the same as in Section V-A.
Similar mechanism can be used for PO to issue an urgent
command to MD j. MD j should respond with an acknowledge-
ment instead of PRODATA.
C. MD j initiates an urgent data report
1) MD j first identifies a certain DCi to relay the message
and records the current timestamp T . PRODATA and DK
are generated as in Step 3 in Section V-A.
MD j→ DCi:
SKE(KDCiMD j ,T ||PRODATA||HASH(DK,PRODATA))
2) DCi verifies the hash and forwards PRODATA to PO.
DCi→ PO: SKE(KPODCi ,T ||PRODATA)
3) PO can then extract T using KPODCi to develop the appro-
priate keys to decrypt PRODATA.
In reporting emergency information, latency and reliability
are very important. In the protocol, MD j does not need to
perform any expensive public key operation before sending
the data report. The latency is thus very small. To en-
hance reliability, MD j can send the data to PO via multiple
DCs. It has to compute HASH(DK,PRODATA) and encrypt
T ||PRODATA||HASH(DK,PRODATA) using different keys
for different DCs in Step 1. As both operations are not
expensive, MD j can send out the reports promptly.
D. PO issues an urgent command to a group of MDs
1) Similar to requesting data, PO should first identify the
DCs that cover all the MDs that it wants to send the urgent
command to. Let the command be COMD. MDLISTi
contains the MDs that DCi should talk to.
PO→ DCi:
SKE(KPODCi ,SIGN(PO,COMD)||MDLISTi||COMD)
2) DCi sends to each MD j in MDLISTi the urgent command.
DCi→MD j: SKE(GKi,SIGN(PO,COMD)||COMD)
The signature of the command by the PO provides authen-
tication check to all MDs and DCs. By using a group key in
Step 2, we share the same issue as in Step 2 of Section V-A.
The administrator can thus select the most appropriate way to
strike a balance of security and efficiency.
VI. GROUPING OPTIMIZATION
A. Preliminaries
When an MD’s data may be collected by more than one DC,
the problem of deciding which DC to allocate to MDs arises.
An umbrella definition for a set of problems to associate DCs
with MDs for collecting data is given below:
Definition 1 (DC to MD Association (DC2MD) Problem ):
Given a set M of |M|= m MDs with data to report and a set
of D of |D|= d DCs to collect the aforementioned data, find
a feasible association to ensure that all the data from MDs
will be collected by the DCs.
The DC2MD problem can be expressed as an instance of
a family of combinatorial optimization problems modeled by
set covering, packing, and partitioning formulations [35]. Very
often, we want to identify a feasible association that gives
the best performance among all possible associations. Best
performance can be the minimization of the cost of data
collection, the total time of data collection, etc. This genre
of problems are collectively referred to as the Family of Set
Problems (FSP) [36].
A more generic formulation of the FSP takes on the
following structure [35]:
min cTx (1)
s.t. Ax≥ e (2)
xi ∈ {0,1} for i = 1,2, ...,d, (3)
where c is a column vector of n costs or weights, x is a column
vector of n decision variables, e is a column vector of k ones,
and A is a kxn matrix of zeros and ones. In the following,
we will study how to optimize the time for data collection in
details.
B. Optimizing the Time for Data Collection
We now consider how to minimize the time to perform
data collection from a group of MDs by selecting a single
appropriate DC to collect data from each MD. To compute
the total time needed for PO to collect the data, we first
define some notations to represent the time needed to perform
a single cryptographic operation defined in Table II. Theoreti-
cally speaking, the time needed for a cryptographic operation
depends on the size of the message. As we only perform public
key operations on small-sized messages, we ignore this factor
and denote T p(OP,A) as the time needed for A to execute
public key cryptographic operation PKE, PKD, SIGN, and
SIGV . For example, the time for PO to sign a message is
T p(SIGN,PO). To capture the effect of message size on the
computational time of symmetric key and hash operations, we
denote the time needed as T s(OP,A,SIZE). As symmetric key
encryption and decryption take roughly the same time, we use
SK to represent both SKE and SKD. We also use HASH to
denote both hash computation and verification. To simplify our
discussion, we assume the size of T ||SIGN(PO,T ) in Section
V-A as 1 unit. That is, the time needed for DCi to develop
message SKE(GKi,T ||SIGN(PO,T )) is T s(SK,DCi,1). The
one-way network delay between A and B is T n(A,B). We also
let xi j = 1 if MD j belongs to Gi.
Table V presents a summary of the cryptographic operations
each entity has to perform in each step of the data collection
process. To simplify our discussion, we use M1, M2, M3,
and M4 to represent the four messages exchanged between
PO, DCs, and MDs as shown in Fig. 6. We only consider
the situation where a DC reports all data collected in a single
message to PO. To illustrate the process of time analysis, we
present Fig. 7 to explain the different time components in the
whole data collection process. In the picture, we assume there
are only two MDs.
We first develop the time needed for DCi, after having pre-
pared M2, to send message M2= SKE(GKi,T ||SIGN(PO,T ))
to MD j and verify the hash of MD j’s reply, which is denoted
as Ti j. Ti j is the sum of the following components:
1) round-trip network delay between DCi and MD j:
2T n(DCi,MD j)
PO	   DCi	   MD1	   MD2	  
M1	  
M2	  
M3	  
M3	  
M4	  
Ti1	  
Ti2	  
M3	  hash	  veriﬁca5on	  
TcDCi	  TDCi	  
Decrypt	  M1	  and	  	  
prepare	  M2	  
Prepare	  M4	  
Retrieve	  data	  
from	  M4	  
Fig. 7. Time for Data Collection
2) time needed for MD j to generate reply M3 (Step 3):
T s(SK,MD j,1)+T p(SIGV,MD j)+T s(SK,MD j,size)+
2T s(HASH,MD j,size) where size is the size of the data
in terms of number of units.
3) time needed for DCi to verify the hash:
T s(HASH,DCi,size)
Before DCi can send message M2 =
SKE(GKi,T ||SIGN(PO,T )) to MD j, DCi needs to decrypt
M1 and prepare M2. As described in Step 2 in Section V-A,
DCi has to spend 2T s(SK,DCi,1) + T p(SIGV,DCi) time to
prepare M2. We now study the time needed for DCi to prepare
the reply (M4) to PO after verifying the hashes of the replies
from all MDs. Let Ni be ∑ j xi j. That is, Ni is the number
of MDs in Gi. The total amount of data received by DCi is
Ni× size. The time to prepare M4 is T s(SK,DCi,Ni× size).
Therefore, the total time needed for DCi from the moment it
receives M1 from PO to the moment it sends out M4 to the
PO is:
T cDCi = 2T
s(SK,DCi,1)+T p(SIGV,DCi)+max j{xi jTi j}
+T s(SK,DCi,Ni× size)
We now study the time from the moment that PO sends
out M1 until the moment that PO successfully decrypts and
verifies the data carried in M4 sent by DCi. We denote
this time as TDCi . To retrieve the raw data from M4 =
SKE(GENKEY (KPODCi ,T ),PRODATA), PO first needs to de-
crypt M4 using GENKEY (KPODCi ,T ). It then needs to decrypt
and verify the hash carried in PRODATA. Therefore, TDCi is
TDCi = 2T
n(PO,DCi)+T cDCi +
2T s(SK,PO,Ni× size)+T s(HASH,PO,Ni× size)
= f (i)+max j{xi jTi j} (4)
where
f (i) = 2T s(SK,DCi,1)+T p(SIGV,DCi)+2T n(PO,DCi)
+2T s(SK,PO,Ni× size)+T s(HASH,PO,Ni× size)
C. Problem Formulation
When PO wants to collect all data as soon as possible,
we should assign each MD to an appropriate DC such that
the maximum TDCi over all i ∈ D is minimized. Such an
objective leads to what is known in the literature as a minimax
problem. From Equation 4, we can simplify the terms into
two major categories for the minimax optimization: One is
the maximizing component (max j{xi jTi j}) and the other is
the summative part ( f (i)). The former consists mostly of
the network delay whose maximum value will determine
the total completion time for data collection by a DC. The
latter includes the processing time, including the cryptographic
computation, whose total time will be a summation operation.
In what follows, we will ignore the maximization components,
as it is rather trivial to address alone, and concentrate on the
summative part. Under a realistic data collection scenario,
summative component will likely be the dominant term to
determine the overall performance.
When the summative part is considered, the problem looks
very similar to the makespan minimization problem from
the scheduling theory [37], [38]. Scheduling theory considers
problems where a set of jobs (tasks) are to be assigned to a set
of machines or processors to satisfy an objective. One machine
can only work on one job at a time. The well-established
3-field classification introduced in [39] uses α|β |γ notation,
where job, machine, and scheduling characteristics are denoted
by α , β , and γ , respectively. The summative part of our
objective function is denoted by Q||Cmax, where arbitrary
number of machines operating at different speeds must be used
to complete a given set of tasks with the minimum makespan
objective. This problem setting is also known in the literature
as uniform parallel machines [40]. In our problem, machines
are DCs, and tasks are MDs whose data need to be collected.
The Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation for our
summative part may be formulated as follows:
min max ∑
j
xi jti j (5)
s.t. ∑
j
xi j = 1, ∀i ∈ D (6)
xi j ∈ {0,1} ∀i ∈ D,∀ j ∈M (7)
where xi j represents whether DC i is assigned to collect data
from MD j, and ti j is the amount of the summative part of
the total data collection time of MD j’s data by DC i.
When we let Cmax represent the maximum data collection
time, the above formulation can be rewritten in a standard
form as follows:
min Cmax (8)
s.t. ∑
j
xi j = 1, ∀i ∈ D (9)
∑
j
xi jti j ≤Cmax, ∀i ∈ D (10)
xi j ∈ {0,1} ∀i ∈ D,∀ j ∈M (11)
The above problem can be shown to be strongly NP-
Hard [41], [42] by a reduction from a 3-Partition problem [43].
Also note that this problem is a kind of the dual of the bin
packing problem as part of the FSP from Equations 1-3 [41],
[44].
This intractability of the problem of minimum makespan
makes it unlikely that a polynomial algorithm exists. Thus,
we have to resort to heuristic algorithms to address it.
D. Heuristic Approaches
When the machines are assumed to be identical, that is
with same speed, then the problem is known as identical
parallel machines, and denoted as P||Cmax [38]. Even for this
relaxation, it has been proven that it is in the domain of NP-
hard problems [39], [45].
A traditional way to deal with scheduling problems starts
with a simple greedy combinatorial algorithm, referred to as
List Scheduling (LS) [46]. Jobs are picked from a pre-specified
list and fed into the machines as they become available.
For P||Cmax, if the job list can be sorted in descending
order of processing times, the resulting algorithm is called
Largest Processing Time (LPT) [47]. Another algorithm, called
multifit, for P||Cmax is proposed in [44]. Note that our problem,
as stated in Equations (5)-(7), is based on Q||Cmax, a more
involved scheduling problem than P||Cmax. We devise the
following two heuristics to tackle Q||Cmax by assuming that
total time of data collection by DCs from MDs is summative.
1) Greedy Algorithm: Longest to Least Loaded First (L3F):
Longest job to the least loaded DC first (L3F) is a greedy
algorithm. We find the largest time for data collection for any
(DC,MD) pair, say δ ,µ . We assign MD µ to a DC that will
complete in the least time. Next, we pick the next largest time
and assign it to the least loaded MD for the corresponding MD.
We iterate until we deplete unassigned MDs. It is obvious that
the complexity of the algorithm is O(d). Algorithm 1 gives a
more formal pseudocode for L3F.
Algorithm 1 Longest to Least Loaded First (L3F).
1: procedure L3F(X)
2: µ ← 0 . makespan
3: for ∀ j ∈M do
4: γ ← Smallest ti j
5: Find least loaded DC that can collect γ’s data
6: update
7: δ ← least loaded DC that can take γ without
exceeding ω
8: update µ
9: end for
10: end procedure
2) Augmented Multifit Algorithm (AMFA): The basic idea
of the multifit approach [44] for P||Cmax is to sort the jobs
and then assign them to the machines in ascending order of
load. We adopt multifit and augment it for our problem as
shown in Algorithm 2. Input to Algorithm 2 are Θ= {ti j,∀i ∈
Algorithm 2 Augmented Multifit Algorithm
1: procedure AMFA(Θ,k)
2: Compute upper and lower bounds of the feasible
objective function value (U , L)
3: while r <= k do
4: ω ← (U +L)/2
5: if FFD(ω) then
6: U ← ω
7: else
8: L = ω
9: end if
10: end while
11: return U
12: end procedure
Fig. 8. Searching for approximation solution in AMFA.
D,∀ j ∈ M} and k is the number of iterations, for which
values 7 to 19 have given good results in simulations, whose
details will be given in Section VII. The basic idea of this
algorithm is to choose a lower bound, L, smaller than which
Cmax will be infeasible, and upper bound, U , above which Cmax
is guaranteed to be feasible, as shown in Figure 8. As noted in
Figure 8, there will be no solution to our problem formulation
when Cmax ≤ L. Similarly, for all values of Cmax ≥U , solution
can be obtained. The area of of interest is the set of values,
marked as Search Area in Figure 8, where pinpoint the exact
point of demarcation between feasible and infeasible is not
clear. Our objective in AMFA from Algorithm 2 is to seek
an approximate value for this demarcation point where the
optimal value is located at. In effect, we are using a binary
search within the search area while iterating through the
AMFA algorithm. Starting off with the mid-point between U
and L, we use an oracle, called FFD, and to be described
below, to check if the our problem with that Cmax is feasible. If
so, we reduce the search area between from [L,U ] to [L, U+L2 ].
Otherwise, we reduce the search area to [U+L2 ,U ]. We settle
an approximate value after a small number of iterations, k.
As alluded above, we use a kind of an oracle, as in the sense
of the theory of computation, to decide whether a solution
is feasible given Cmax and Θ. The idea of this oracle, called
First Fit Decreasing FFD algorithm is to find a near-optimum
answer to the question [44]. As noted earlier, we extend FFD
and adopt it for our problem Q||Cmax as shown in Algorithm 3.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to assess the performance of our approaches, we
have used IBM’s CPLEX optimization package to solve the
ILP formulations and implemented our approaches in C++.
Algorithm 3 First Fit decreasing (FFD).
1: procedure FFD(Θ,ω)
2: for ∀ j ∈M do
3: γ ← Largest ti j column
4: σ ← smallest in γ
5: δ ← least loaded DC that can take γ without
exceeding ω
6: if δ = NULL then
7: return false
8: else
9: assign σ ’s MD to DC δ
10: end if
11: end for
12: end procedure
A. ILP Optimal solution versus heuristics
First, we would like to check how our approaches fare with
the optimal solutions provided by the CPLEX to the extend
possible. Since the problem is NP-Hard, the ILP formulation
that can be solved by CPLEX hit a wall rather quickly:
After about 70 number of MDs and 35 DCs, CPLEX started
taking very long to yield any results. Thus, we have run some
simulations up to 70 MDs and 35 DCs each with 30 runs to
get an idea of the comparative performance results. The time
for collecting data from MDs by DCs are randomly generated
from a uniform probability distribution in the range of 10 to
100. The number of DCs took the values of 10, 20, and 30
while the number of MDs were assigned 25, 40, 55, and 70.
All possible combinations were run for 30 times for statistical
significance. Figure 9 shows the performance of ILP, AMFA,
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Fig. 9. Ratio of total data collection time for AMFA and L3F to Optimal
ILP.
and L3F for all 12 combinations of the number of MDs and
DCs. It plots the total time values returned by the ILP from
CPLEX as the reference point and hence shows it as a straight
line on bottom. Dashed line in the middle with circles is the
results of the AMFA approximation algorithm, showing the
discrepancy with the optimal ILP. As shown, AMFA is pretty
close, whose mean distance was about 1.34. In other words,
AMFA appeared to be 1.34 times of the optimum value. L3F,
being a greedy algorithm, performed worse with an average
distance ratio to the optimum of approximately 1.96. Note
that L3F showed a higher level of variability than AMFA.
Figure 10 shows the box plots with mean values in squares
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Fig. 10. Box plots for AMFA and L3F algorithms.
for the AMFA and L3F algorithms. Upper and lower values of
the box shows the 75th and 25th percentiles, the line median
and the small square point the mean. Again, the reference
point is the optimum values produced by the ILP, and the
y axis shows the ratio of the distance of AMFA and L3F.
As shown, AMFA has a much narrower distribution than L3F
with significantly better expected approximation values. The
variability, as mentioned before, is also corroborated by these
box plots.
B. Extensive simulations of the heuristics
As indicated above, due the intractability of our problem,
CPLEX cannot yield results after a rather small numbers of
MDs and DCs. Thus, in order to evaluate the performance of
the AMFA and L3F algorithms with larger configurations, we
had to drop the ILP from the simulations.
We have run extensive simulations with the number of MDs
going up to 1000 in increments of 50 starting from 50 and
number of DCs at 25, 50, 75, 100. We had a total of 80
unique (MD,DC) pairs. Again, in order to attain statistical
significance, each combination pair was run 30 times. The
time values for the data collection from MDs by DCs were
generated using a uniform density function in the range of 10
to 100. Figure 11 displays the total time of data collection
for AMFA over the number of MDs from 50 to 1000 for 25,
50, 75, and 100 DCs as separate lines. Except for when the
number of DCs was equal to 25, the total time increases with
respect to larger number of MDs is with moderate slope. When
DC is equal to 25, the increase is rather steep but still linear.
This behavior might indicate that when there is significant
imbalance between the number of DCs and MDs the total time
to collect data may adversely affected. This point of operating
overload is hard to have a threshold value to associate with
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Fig. 11. Performance of AMFA in terms of total data collection time over
changing the number of MDs with 4 different number of DCs.
but nevertheless should be considered. The bottom line is that
AMFA behavior is still smooth and intuitive.
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Fig. 12. Performance of L3F in terms of total data collection time over
changing the number of MDs with 4 different number of DCs.
Figure 12 plots the notion as Figure 11 but for L3F. While
similar behavior for DC-MD imbalance is still observed here,
the overall pattern is much less stable than AMFA. The
magnitude of values are also greater. In order to more clearly
depict the AMFA versus L3F behavior, we plotted the 25
and 100 DC lines in Figure 13, where the aforementioned
smoothness and magnitude differences are more obvious.
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the overall performance of
AMFA and L3F over all 80 combinations of number of DC
and MDs. AMFA’s smoothness across the range of (MD, DC)
pairs is evident while L3F suffers from wide oscillations.
Figure 16 shows the ratio difference of performance for L3F
with respect to AMFA over 80 different MD-DC combinations.
L3F is the zigzag line at the top with the middle showing the
normalized performance of AMFA. Performance of L3F can
get as high as 2.3 times the AMFA’s with the average distance
of 1.6062 times. We also plotted the extrapolated performance
line for the ILP based on the average ratio of distance from
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Fig. 16. Distance ratio of L3F to AMFA as the reference line for the total data collection time with extrapolated ILP performance line with 80 different
pairs of (DC,MD) combinations.
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Fig. 13. Performance of AMFA and L3F in terms of total data collection
time over changing the number of MDs with number of DCs set to 25 and
100.
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Fig. 14. Performance of AMFA in terms of total data collection time over
changing the numbers of MDs and DCs together.
AMFA and ILP from our simulation results in Section VII-A.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The bidirectional power and information flow of the Smart
Grid vision has led to the proliferation of nodes, such as
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Fig. 15. Performance of L3F in terms of total data collection time over
changing the numbers of MDs and DCs together.
measurement devices, sensors, smart meters, etc. These de-
vices generate unprecedented amounts of data. The existing,
legacy protocols are not capable of addressing this new phe-
nomenon. In order to address this challenge, we propose a
comprehensive and secure communications protocol to enable
a power operator to collect data from measurement devices in
a practical, scalable, and efficient manner under a hierarchical
data collection model. Intermediary nodes relay are assumed to
follow the honest-but-curious model in relaying the data. Thus,
our protocol paves the way for third party service provisioning,
as envisioned by the NIST Smart Grid Framework. Examples
of such third party services include outsourcing data collection
by 3rd party DCs, utilizing cloud computing services for data
storage and processing, etc. We formulate an optimization
problem for associating the intermediary relay nodes with
measurement devices for data collection in order to minimize
the total data collection time. The problem is intractable and
thus we present two fast approximation heuristics. Extensive
simulations results show that heuristics provide a very good
approximation with fast convergence.
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